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Life and the Technical Transformation of Diffrance: Stiegler and the Noo-
Politics of Becoming Non-Inhuman 
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Through a re-articulation of Derridean diffrance, Bernard Stiegler claims that the human is defined 
by an originary default that displaces all psychic and social life onto technical supplements. His phi-
losophy of technics re-articulates the logic of the supplement as concerning both human reflexivity 
and its supports, and the history of the diffrance of life itself. This has been criticised for reducing 
DerridaÕs work to a metaphysics of presence, and for instituting a humanism of the relation to the 
inorganic. By refuting these claims, this article will show that StieglerÕs doubling of diffrance enables 
him to articulate the human as constituted by both the individuation characteristic of ÔlifeÕ, and that of 
a technical, psychic and collective individuation. Putting forward a reading of the logic of the trace in 
life, and emphasising the aspects of Leroi-Gourhan, Simondon, and Canguilhem that Stiegler uses 
in his reading of Derrida, I will demonstrate that the political stakes of adaption and adoption in Noo-
Politics require this re-articulation of diffrance. Technics shapes the human future, arising from this 
differential mutation; marking the invention of the human as the site of the political. 
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StieglerÕs initial encounter with Derrida in The Fault of Epimetheus is concerned with establishing 
the origin of the human as aporetic, defined by a lack of quality that is always supplemented by 
technical supports (Stiegler 1998). The larger aim of this critical engagement is to re-cast the origin 
of the human in the technical co-contamination of the transcendental and the empirical. What sepa-
rates the human from life in general is the technical support of psychic and social (symbolic) individ-
uations, related by a principle of diffrance, empirically and historically articulated. This has been 
criticised for reducing diffrance to the presence of an apparently ÔpureÕ life outside of technics (Ben-
nington 2000), and a humanism of the relation to the inorganic (Colony 2011). Instead, I will argue 
that StieglerÕs doubling of diffrance enables him to articulate the human as constituted by both the 
individuation of life, and of psychic and collective individuation. Putting forward a reading of the logic 
of the trace as present in life, and emphasising the aspects of the work of Andr Leroi-Gourhan, 
Gilbert Simondon, and Georges Canguilhem i that Stiegler uses in his reading of Derrida, I will 
demonstrate that StieglerÕs political project of establishing a Noo-Politics requires this re-articulation 
of diffrance. This allows a consideration of the contemporary political use of Derridean concepts by 
Stiegler, that the adoption of new forms of human existence can be thwarted by the enforcement of 
adaption, eliminating the transformative dimension of the diffrance between the human and the 
technical. I will argue, therefore, that StieglerÕs contribution to the politics of deconstruction should 
be understood in this light; he puts its concepts to work in the continual political construction of a 
human future. 
 
The Origin of the Human and the Rupture in Diffrance 
 
The key element that enables Stiegler to think this is the doubling of diffrance, to show that beyond 
spatialisation and temporalisation, a new form of diffrance emerges with the human: the co-consti-
tution of the psychic interior and its technical and symbolic milieus. Technical objects are external-
ised forms of human memory, inscriptions in matter that support symbolic projections, and form 
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shared social memory. Psychic interiority is the re-interiorisation of this pre-individual fund, as a 
diffrant transformation. For Stiegler, neither interior or exterior can be raised to the level of priority 
(Stiegler 1998: 152). Locatable only within the complex of being-in-default, human subjects are the 
product of an originary complication of interior and exterior, which structurally links technicity and the 
human psyche. 
Stiegler is indebted to Leroi-Gourhan for this thesis, who argues that the defining traits of hu-
manity (anticipation, the experience of temporality, and enhanced cognitive capacity) have a mate-
rialist rather than idealist basis. The claim that tools invented the human counters Ôcerebralist' ac-
counts that presuppose larger brain capacity in the development of tool use. Instead, hominisation 
began due to a re-arrangement of the pre-hominid skeleton which freed the hands for the manipula-
tion of tools, in turn allowing for the expansion of the skull to accommodate increased cerebral growth 
(Leroi-Gourhan 1993: 26). Stiegler expands this argument to claim that human anticipation is struc-
turally linked to technicity, its origin being in this necessary (and therefore transcendental) default. 
This transcendental condition is inaccessible outside of its empirical determination by historical forms 
of technical systems: 'there is a history of technological possibilities of anticipation - which is the 
history of the different mirror stages in which humanity reflects itself' (Stiegler 1998: 159). Stiegler 
utilises Leroi-Gourhan's argument to claim that there is no pre-existing human mirrored or extended 
by technics, but one constituted by it, where the subject is irreducibly linked to the historical technical 
object, and any investigation of this transcendental condition takes place from behind an empirical 
horizon (Lewis 2013: 61). This confounds the metaphysical resolution of the event of human origin, 
as such an investigation is constrained by it's historically contingent technical supports, on both the 
side of the investigator, and the investigated. 
As such, the human is not the product of a biological phylum that has priority over the technical, 
but rather a complex and irreducible aporia between the technical and the biological. This forms the 
relation between psychic and social memory. Experience of the world, and our memories selected 
from this experience, are informed by technical facticity as externalised collective memory. These 
three forms of memory are linked by a relation of diffrance for Stiegler: the re-interiorisation of 
technically supported ideas is always a transformation of this material. There is always a translation 
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by the individual in the adoption of collective forms of existence. Diffrance marks this particular 
organisation of differentiation as 'the pursuit of the evolution of the living by other means than life', 
where the absolutely singular individual adoption or interiorisation of nonliving memory is conditioned 
by its shared facticity (Stiegler 1998: 135). The object of thought is formed in the relationship between 
individual retentions, social retentions and technically supported retentions, an organisation made 
possible by the aporia of the structural coupling between cerebrality and technicity (James 2013). 
This requires a transformation of what Derrida initially put forward under the term diffrance, in order 
to articulate a difference between this human form of individuation, and the spatialisation and tem-
poralisation of life itself.ii Stiegler's return to Leroi-Gourhan, a key reference point in Of Grammatol-
ogy, allows him to claim that something absolutely new occurs in the emergence of the coupling 
between the human and the technical. This is the doubling of diffrance, which separates a technical 
form from its general character 'which is nothing else than the history of life itself', in order to show 
that it is the co-constitution of the human and technics that puts the unity of humanity into disrepute 
(ibid 136). The appearance of humanity and technicity is conditioned upon a transformation of the 
logic of arche-writing which pre-exists them, opening up the horizon of the adoption of new forms of 
technical diffrance. 
By referring back to Leroi-Gourhan on this coupling, Stiegler argues that he can resolve a 
tension that he alleges exists in parts of the Derridean corpus on diffrance. On the one hand, as 
stated, it is: 'temporization [that] is also temporalization and spacing, the becoming-time of space 
and the becoming-space of time' (Derrida 1972: 8). As 'differentiation and deferral, a spacing of time 
and a temporalization of space', it refers to 'life in generalÉ[that] there is time from the moment there 
is life' (Stiegler 1998: 138-9). Such an assertion is the reason why grammatology cannot be reduced 
to 'one of the sciences of man', for the naming of man is predicated upon the 'graphie in generalÉas 
a stage or articulation in the history of lifeÉthe history of the grammē' (Derrida 1976: 83-4). It is this 
ÔstageÕ that Stiegler mobilises to draw conclusions from another passage: 'the trace is the differance 
which opens appearing and signification. Articulating the living upon the non-living in general, origin 
of all repetition' (ibid 65). That is, there is 'an emergence that makes the grammē appear as such', 
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which we 'cannot thinkÉwithout the most general concept of the grammē' (ibid 84).iii There is a 
separation between the grammē as a general logic of all life, and the Ôas suchÕ of the human stage, 
that articulates the appearance of this difference to the understanding.  
Whether this is a faithful reading of ÔDiffranceÕ and Of Grammatology is not the issue at stake 
here. Rather, it is the manner in which Stiegler transforms diffrance through his adoption of it. This 
adoption asserts the existence or appearing of a new stage; the inscription of the living onto the non-
living which constitutes the human default of origin, opening up the noetic capacity that makes the 
very thought of diffrance possible. There is a passage from diffrance as 'pure physis', to the think-
ing of this logic through technics that constitutes a slippage in DerridaÕs work that '[remains] to be 
thought' fully (Stiegler 1998: 139). Originary prostheticity marks the passage from a general logic of 
deferral, one that is ÔÒ[o]lder" than Being itselfÕ (Derrida 1972: 26), to the human articulation of 
memory retentions onto the non-living which makes the very thought of Being possible. This means 
that the human, as a mode of Being, is unthinkable in its purity, and must be thought as a history of 
its forms. As human thought, for Stiegler, is conditioned by this technical horizon, diffrance can only 
be conceptually rendered within an archaeology of the relationship between technics and psychic 
interiority, meaning it is articulated historically, rather than quasi-transcendentally. This project is one 
that Derrida announced in the 'history of supplement' but 'did not himself ever carry out' (Stiegler 
2013a: 167). Diffrance has Ôno unique nameÕ (Derrida 1972: 27); for Stiegler this is because it has 
many names, articulated both as the general differentiation of space and time, and according to a 
history technical supports. 
StieglerÕs resolution of this hesitation that he sees in Derrida's work on diffrance requires 
thinking technics as epiphylogenesis, a third form of memory that supplements those already found 
in life: genetic and epigenetic memory. Diffrance as life in general is doubled, in order to claim that 
human technicity is an escape from the non-intentional movement of diffrance in biological evolu-
tion, into an evolution by the intentional manipulation of inorganic supports. This amounts to the 
preservation and subsequent adoption of the experience of others: 'the conservation, accumulation, 
and sedimentation of successive epigeneses' (ibid 140). Whereas individual experience in other 
Life and the Technical Transformation of Diffrance 
  6 
species is lost in death, or conserved only in genetic modifications and natural selection (as non-
conscious species level memory), the human can transmit individual experience to others, a preser-
vation which constitutes culture, history, and ethnic differentiation. In StieglerÕs words, 'epiphyloge-
nesis is a break with pure life, in that in the latter, epigenesis is precisely what is not conserved' 
(Stiegler 1998: 140). This inaugurates a difference between adaption and adoption which is central 
for StieglerÕs politics, as we will see. Crucially, his argument pivots on the claim that this break is a 
transformation of diffrance from within a technical horizon that makes thought possible. 
 
Diffrance as the Arche-Writing of Life 
Geoffrey Bennington, however, has claimed that this means that Stiegler reduces life to presence 
and technics to positivity (Bennington 2000: 162-179).iv He takes issue with the articulation of an 
archaeological history of the incarnations of diffrance, following a rupture with ÔpureÕ life, that does 
not fall into a positivism of technics. Bennington summarises: 'Stiegler is taking over from Derrida a 
certain generalised structureÉwhich he is on the one hand appropriating' as technics, and therefore 
as 'the passage from the genetic to the non-genetic and thereby from the animal to the human' (ibid 
169). After noting that this appropriation relies on highlighting an inconsistency in diffrance, four 
key points in StieglerÕs use of Derrida are put forward: 1) he assumes that diffrance as Ô"life in 
generalÓÉis a general definition', 2) he '[identifies] life with physis', 3) assumes that 'the emergence 
of Òintentional consciousnessÓ [is] the appearing of an Òas suchÓ of the gramme [that] must be thought 
of as a breakÕ, and 4) is 'surprised to find diffrance on both sides of such a presumed break' (ibid 
170-1). The fault in StieglerÕs series of suppositions is that 'physis is or could be a pure presence 
subsequently affected by diffrance', whereas diffrance shows that 'no concept can attain to the 
value of ÒpresenceÓ, and that this situation is (logically) originary' (ibid 171). Not only is life placed 
into a position of presence, but it is opposed to technics: Stiegler 'force[s] the whole philosophical 
argumentation of Derrida through the ÒpassageÓ of the emergence of mankind' which 'commits him 
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to a certain positivism about difference' (ibid). These criticisms force us to consider how an under-
standing of diffrance as life in general does not reduce it to pure presence. Against BenningtonÕs 
reading, this can be asserted through the already existing relationship between deconstruction and 
life that is built upon by StieglerÕs use of the work of Leroi-Gourhan, Simondon, and Canguilhem. 
'There is diffrance before as after the anthropological rupture' (Stiegler 2009: 157). This state-
ment suggests, in opposition to Bennington, that two forms of diffrance can be separated without 
abstracting the human from life. Clarity on this point can be found by returning to Derrida to show 
how life itself is characterised by diffrance, but also how Stiegler supplements such a view with the 
notion of different regimes of individuation to be found in Simondon. Francesco Vitale has recently 
claimed that Derrida supported the view that: 'differance [is] the irreducible and structural condition 
of the life of the living' (Vitale 2014: 96). For Vitale, the conjunction of biology and cybernetics allowed 
Derrida to provide a definition of life that 'is regulated by the possibility of elaborating iterable traces', 
a capacity which is 'prior to the opposition between man and the animalsÕ, which means that 'the 
animal in general must be endowed with a structure of retention and protention and, thus, must be 
capable of memory' (Ibid 103). Through his reading of DerridaÕs unpublished seminar on the work of 
biologist Franois Jacob, entitled La Vie La Mort, Vitale shows that the structure of the trace and the 
necessity of iteration through reproduction goes all the way down to the very conditions of life in 
DNA; Ô[t]he living structures itself as a system of arche-writing, as the retention, elaboration and 
protention of a weave, a tissue of traces, namely, as a text' (ibid 110). Life is a weave of traces that 
constantly displaces itself onto supplementary parts:  
'the sense of the genetic message does not depend on its alleged content but on the order of 
combination of the elements, which produces a sequence of interactions in the cell. Every element 
taken by itself does not produce any effect, precisely as the letter of the alphabet has no meaning 
in itself' (ibid 107-8). 
The irreducibility of this reproduction to presence, situates imperfection as diffrance at the heart of 
life. 
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There is nothing in StieglerÕs work to suggest that he would dissent from this definition of life 
as diffrance. His use of the term ÔpureÕ to designate life is a strategic highlighting of the specific 
difference of the human form of differentiation, that technical systems are utilised to counter the 
dissolution at work in diffrance. This relationship between the human and the technical institutes a 
new form of what Simondon refers to as a regime of individuation. Importantly, Stiegler asserts that 
diffrance must in fact be thought of today in terms of individuation (Stiegler 2015c: 63). Simondon 
argued that individual entities should be understood not from their unity, but from the perspective of 
a complex, and ongoing process of production, where stability is a surface effect of an ongoing onto-
genesis (Simondon 2009: 5). What is key is that within these processes of individuation a final state 
is always deferred, as individuals are formed in a transductive relation to other individuals (Stiegler 
2011a: 38-9). This allows one to distinguish between different regimes of individuation, without rei-
fying differences between them. 
Simondon identified three forms of individuation: the physical, the vital, and the psycho-social. 
What is important here, is that the regime of vital individuation proceeds by forming what Simondon 
called ÔmetastabilitiesÕ, the difference in metastability between the living and the human being what 
marks the doubling of diffrance. A metastability is an apparent and temporary form of stability that 
is Ôcapable of evolvingÉalive with the contradictions and differencesÕ it has hitherto been part of 
(Chabot 2013: 102). Simondon applies this definition to the individuation of life:  
'the living conserves within itself a permanent activity of individuation. It is not only the result of 
individuation, like in the case of the crystal or the molecule, but it is the theater of individua-
tionÉ[w]ithin the living itself, there is a more complete regime of internal resonance, one that 
requires permanent communication and that maintains a metastability that is a condition of life' 
(Simondon 2009: 7).  
The metastability of the living is constituted by a permanent re-production and establishment of  a 
resonance between components, an arche-writing that means no single element constitutes the to-
tality of the system of living individuation, and that unity is always deferred onto a supplementary 
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element. Conjoining Derrida and Simondon, Stiegler argues that life is the autoimmune process by 
which unity and stability are deferred, but through the reproduction and the diffrant co-articulation 
of its elements, attempts to remain stable. Life as diffrance, or autoimmune process, is an individ-
uation process that forms metastabilities, and therefore constant transformations that are 'driven 
towards upholding the system in its greatest potentialityÕ (Stiegler 2014a: 194).v What Stiegler wishes 
to argue is that for the human there is something else at work; the deliberate manipulation of how 
these metastabilities are produced, through the co-constitution of human and technical life. Simon-
don allows Stiegler to combine the thought of deferral at work in diffrance with the notion of differ-
entiated regimes of this logic found in the notion of individuation (Ross 2013: 245). 
The ability to resist the autoimmune tendency by forming metastabilities can be understood as 
the ability to resist shocks from an organismÕs environment. Stiegler turns to Canguilhem to think 
this. In the latter's terms: 'life is not a monotonous deduction, a rectilinear movementÉit is discus-
sionÉwith an environment where there are leaks, holes, escapes and unexpected resistances' 
(Canguilhem 1991: 198). It 'is experience, that is to say, improvisation, the utilisation of occurrences' 
that the living organism must use in order to preserve itself (Canguilhem 2008: 90). In StieglerÕs 
summary; 'life is a process and, in the course of life, life-forms stabilize themselves' (Stiegler 2013b: 
28). What is key, however, is that while it is conceived as a form of memory in DerridaÕs reading of 
Jacob, there is no intentionality in this process at a general level. This is JacobÕs central axiom: 'the 
programme cannot receive lessons from experience' (Jacob 1974: 11).vi The organismÕs genetic 
programme resists shocks from the environment, which for Canguilhem is a 'margin of tolerance for 
the inconstancies of the environment' (Canguilhem 1991: 197). Those that can persist in a particular 
milieu and its variability, or infidelity, are able to reproduce through what is essentially 'accidental 
survival' (Moore 2013: 20-21). JacobÕs axiom, once submitted to this deconstructive reading, refers 
to the differentiation of the genomic in the way it adapts to these inconstancies, but not through the 
intentional activity of the organism. As Vitale summarises, his Ôrecourse to the text as a model for 
describing the logic of the living is not accidental: the text imposes itself because of the very nature 
of livingÕ, a nature that is defined by the logic of the trace (Vitale 2014: 108).vii Survival, adaption, 
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and the production of normative activity is always a transformation of the metastable set of potentials 
that constitute this woven text of life. 
It would be foolish to deny that the human is not subject to this diffrance of life. What sepa-
rates the human from the living is that the relationship of the individual to its milieu is sutured by the 
technical supplement. Stiegler's reference to Canguilhem supplements his reading of Derrida 
through Leroi-Gourhan and Simondon on this point. The human is able to resist the autoimmune 
tendency towards destruction that is internal to life through the technical extension of the body, which 
moves normativity from the level of the organism to the relationship between the organism, the tech-
nical, and the social. Human individuation or diffrance produces metastabilities through its technical 
supports. But this also means that the threats to individuation are different to that of life. What 
Canguilhem refers to as the pathological, or the inconstancies of the environment, are not derived 
merely from the externalities that impinge on the organism, but from artificial technical supplements 
themselves: 
Ôwe cannot clearly understand how the same man with the same organs feels normal or abnormal 
at different times in environments suited to man unless we understand how organic vitality flour-
ishes in man in the form of technical plasticity' (Canguilhem 1991: 201). 
A new Ôinfidelity of the milieuÕ arises from the transformation of diffrance in the establishment of a 
new regime of individuation, induced by a re-articulation of the production of normative metastabili-
ties through the deliberate adoption of techniques, rather than adaption to natural selection (Stiegler 
2013b: 29). The transformation of diffrance that Stiegler wants to effect is this materialisation, and 
therefore differentiation and historicisation, of the quasi-transcendental logic of deferral. It is his use 
of Leroi-Gourhan, Simondon, and Canguilhem that enables him to do this, for they allow him to 
define diffrance at both the level of the organic, and the inorganic adoption of norms. 
This means that the possibility for the preservation of experience is found in the structural coupling 
between the human and the technical, which re-articulates the logic of diffrance at work in life in 
general. While it is still within this general logic of autoimmunity, the human is capable of preserving 
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its experience beyond the differentiation of the genetic program, and passing this on across gener-
ations. This opens up noetic capacities without opposing them to a pure understanding of life. Si-
mondon states this continuity as follows: 
'Being as subject and being as object arise from the same primitive reality, and the thought that 
now appears to institute an inexplicable relation between object and subject in fact prolongs this 
initial individuation; the conditions of possibility of knowledge are in fact the causes of existence 
of the individuated being' (Simondon 2005: 127, cited in Combes 2013: 7-8). 
The knowing subject emerges from the same pre-individual milieu as vital individuation, as a different 
kind of normative activity between the human and this milieu, which is constituted by technical ob-
jects. There is a transformation of diffrance that occurs with the re-structuring of the human envi-
ronment by non-genetic forms of memory, opening up the expansion of cerebral activities and the 
prolonging of normativity beyond the autoimmunity of life itself. Where Derrida states that Ôthe reve-
nant, between life and death, dictates an impossible mourning, an endless mourning - life itselfÕ 
(Derrida 2005a: 35), Stiegler argues that the technical threshold established between human life and 
death re-articulates this spectral logic in a different manner. 
 
The Positivism of Technics and the Problem of Inorganic Privilege 
Even if physis, or life itself, is not subjected to presence, something achieved through Stiegler's 
connection of Leroi-Gourhan, Simondon, and Canguilhem to diffrance, what of the technical sedi-
mentations that allow the constitution of the human? Colony criticises Stiegler on the grounds of a 
positivism of the human-technics coupling that sees 'nonhuman lifeÉin universal terms', and there-
fore 'overlooksÉthe fact that nonhuman life as diffrance was always already articulated by a rela-
tion to inorganic materiality and, thus, by what is other to life' (Colony 2011: 84-5).viii What Stiegler 
overlooks by separating nonhuman and human life by way of the default of origin, is that diffrance 
asserts that nonhuman temporality is already related to the inorganic, and does not exist within a 
homogenous temporality of its own (ibid 86-7). Moving forward from BenningtonÕs critique, Colony 
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claims that the organological constitution of the human is 'pervasive[ly] anthropocentric', despite its 
'challenge' to those humanisms that would simply fix 'the essence of the human in a traditional met-
aphysical determination' (ibid 88). Taken together, these criticisms suggest that StieglerÕs humanism 
consists grants the human privileged access to the pursuit of life by inorganic means, which is in turn 
reduced to a positivistic knowledge. 
This ÔhumanismÕ is not as crude as it first appears for two reasons. First, while originary for the 
human, technicity is not restricted to it in principle, as it is the technical tendency itself that invents 
the human. Second, this means that the human is caught between two pharmacological tendencies, 
one curative, the other poisonous.ix The vector of hominisation is curative, allowing access to noetic 
capacities, but it is inextricably linked to a tendency towards regression, as it is still caught within the 
arche-writing of the biological. This can be thought with adoption and adaption, the former referring 
to the content transformation of the human by its adoption of technical supports, the latter referring 
to the emptying of any singularisation from this process. By doubling diffrance and placing the 
human within both of its logics, Stiegler forces us to think a politics which is only a humanism to the 
extent that it problematises the constant redefinition of becoming non-inhuman in adoption, against 
the tendency to regress to inhumanity in adaption. 
We have already seen that the diffrance of life involves an articulation with the inorganic, 
through the relation of the arche-writing of DNA and the metastabilities this forms in tandem with an 
environment. The key to showing that StieglerÕs work is not naively humanist is to see the technical 
as a tendency which invented the human, in an unlocatable rupture that transformed the relation 
between pre-hominids and their milieu. Stiegler writes: 'the appearance of the human coincides with 
a sudden hegemony of the epiphylogenetic within the developing process of differentiation. ÒThe 
humanÓ is precisely this hegemonyÕ (Stiegler 2009: 161.) Epiphylogenesis is a tendency that com-
poses with other tendencies: 'the technical dynamic precedes the social dynamic and imposes itself 
thereupon' (Stiegler 1998: 67). Understanding the technical dynamic as prior to the human means 
that the pursuit of life by inorganic means is in no way an a priori privilege. Instead, as Ian James 
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has summarised, 'a logic of technicity precedes the human, and that only on the basis of this prece-
dence does it then come to constitute the human as a hegemonic but by no means exclusive regime 
of the technical' (James 2010: 214). This tendency is still present within the life of other organisms, 
but not to the same extent. With this clarification, we can see in a more precise light the difference 
between the two regimes of diffrance: the first mode consists of tendencies that are autoimmune, 
individuation processes defined by adaption to environmental pressures which may involve the use 
of, but not evolution via, the technical. The second, following the rupture of hominisation, marks a 
hegemony of technical tendencies over human life, allowing the pursuit of evolution through inor-
ganic means, and therefore its adoptive capacities. Both human and nonhuman life are composed 
of tendencies that are inseparable from the forces with which they compose and decompose differ-
entially, forming different regimes of individuation (Stiegler 2011a: 58-61). What marks out the hu-
man, is a pre-dominance of the technical tendency, and therefore the capacity for noetic, adoptive 
activity, rather than a restriction of this tendency to the human over other forms of life. 
Despite this break with the prior logic of diffrance, these human tendencies are not free from 
the spectral grasp of deferral, and are irreducible to a positivism. This is because the technical in-
vention of the human occurs within a 'system of constraintsÉa play of limitsÉa combination of 
forces' that 'frees ever-new possibilities - in this sense [it] invents them' (Stiegler 1998: 75). The 
human does not simply wield the technical, rather, itÕs possibilities are forged by technics. Epiphylo-
genesis frees up the possibility of new processes of individuation, supported by technical milieus, 
but these individuation processes are irreducible to knowledge understood as pure positivity be-
cause they are formative of knowledge. The co-becoming of psychic and technical individuations, 
and the collective individuations they support, means that knowledge only ever emerges from adop-
tion, and therefore transformation. 
This threefold articulation, between the technical, the psychic, and the social, which Stiegler 
refers to as General Organology, is a regime of diffrance that co-implicates the terms involved 
(Stiegler 2014b: 5). Derrida refuses to acknowledge that sense can be given over to us by technicity 
in this manner: 'the origin of sense makes no senseÉthat which constitutes sense is senseless' 
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(Derrida & Stiegler 2002: 108-9). In concurrence with Bennington, the Derridean response to an 
organology of sense, as Ben Roberts sums up, is the question of Ôhow is theoretical and historical 
knowledge of ÒtechnicsÓ possible, given thatÉtechnics is first of all what makes theory and history 
possible?' (Roberts 2005). However, this Ôtheoretical and historical knowledgeÕ is always thwarted 
by its individuation, a diffrance between externalised and adopted experience. This organological 
origin of sense is what is at stake in the accusations of positivism in StieglerÕs re-figuration of diff-
rance. Technics opens up a play between the determination of memory in inorganic matter, and the 
indetermination of its re-interiorisation according to a logic of diffrance. There are rules or conditions 
of access to ÔknowledgeÕ, defined by the inheritance of tradition formed by epiphylogenesis that forms 
an individual world, but these rules open access to the indeterminate: Ô[t]he improbable cannot be 
reduced; there is always an excess over the programmatic, an excess that animates it in the first 
place' (Stiegler 2001: 261).  
This means that knowledge as an individuation process cannot be reduced to positivism, be-
cause it is always an adoption of an organological horizon that conditions the rules of its emergence, 
as a criteria of selection (Stiegler 2010b: 87-8; Stiegler 2011b: 39). Further, the condition of this 
criteria of selection is not neutral, something Stiegler thinks through the pharmakon. Re-reading 
Derrida on this point, where Ôthe pharmakon and writing are thus always involved in questions of life 
and deathÕ (Derrida 1981: 105), of curative and poisonous tendencies, Stiegler applies this logic to 
technics as a whole. According to the historical development of the way it sutures human existence, 
the poisonous and curative tendencies of the pharmakon are articulated differently in different tech-
nical systems. This can thought by understanding the two pharmacological tendencies as adaption 
and adoption. Darwinian notions of adaption cannot be applied to human existence (Moore 2013: 
21), as the chance variation involved in the differentiation of organisms and species involve no in-
tentionality (something that unfolds according a logic of diffrance). The human regime of individu-
ation is characterised not by adaption, but by adoption: the deliberate taking on of new technical 
supplements, transforming the social systems that they support. This means Ônatural selection has 
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given way to artificial selectionÕ (Stiegler 2015a: 31). This adoption is what differentiates human dif-
france from that of the living: the human projects its unity forward through the technical support of 
its individuation (Stiegler 2011a: 23-4). Nevertheless, this does not mean that the human is com-
pletely separated from adaption. This tendency can be induced by the short-circuiting of adoption by 
stupidity, the inability to transform and singularise this projection into the future:  
Ôlearning-internalization is a process of adoption. As the inverse of this learning and apprentice-
ship, and of these adoptions, transmissions and transindividuations, segmented markets operat-
ing via Òage groupingsÓ are promoted by pharmaka submitted to the adaptive processes in which 
consumption naturally consists: that which is consumed cannot be adopted, since on the contrary 
it must be immediately disposableÕ (Stiegler 2013b: 130).  
Taking place through this pharmacological uncertainty, human individuation does not consist in an 
absolute separation from the arche-writing of life, and a privilege with regard to the inorganic as 
Colony claims, but instead emerges out of the relation to the inorganic through a different form of 
individuation that is a new relation to its milieu, a relation of adoption that can never escape the 
dangers of adaption. 
 
The Human as the Site of the Political: Diffrance, Noo-Politics, and Becoming Non-Inhuman 
Hence, StieglerÕs non-positivist reading of technics opens up onto a politics of becoming human. The 
ramifications of this politics arises from the doubling of diffrance. Three such ramifications  can be 
identified in conclusion.x First, he uses this historicisation of diffrance to understand different re-
gimes of human individuation, based on how individuation relies on technical supports, constituting 
an organological genealogy. This makes possible a genealogy of the ways in which the logic of 
diffrance threatens the possibility of adopting a new human future, with the imposition of the adap-
tive dimension of the pharmakon. This requires a break from diffrance as life, as it is conditioned 
by the tendential dynamics of technical systems, and is therefore constituted by the transductive and 
differential relationship between psychic, social and technical individuations. The line between the 
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human and life is constantly re-drawn and re-constituted. The political consists in the identification 
of how adaption and adoption condition the creation of new norms in this regime of individuation 
(Stiegler 2010a: 82). This is precisely why Stiegler speaks of a becoming non-inhuman: we are never 
fully human, and are always performatively reconstituting the ÔshibbolethÕ between animality and 
humanity, because we are irreducibly both (Stiegler 2009: 157, 162). This continual (re)constitution 
means Ôthere is something not shown, that there is ciphered singularity: irreducible to any concept, 
to any knowledge, even to a history of tradition,Õ that nevertheless must continually be shown in the 
empirical articulations of this transcendental logic (Derrida 2005b: 33). Stiegler therefore challenges 
any simple institution of the human, by positing the pharmacological figure of the non-inhuman that 
adopts new norms, which is always threatened by its inhuman dissolution in adaption (Barker 2012: 
14-15). Diffrance, when understood through transduction of regimes of individuation, can be con-
nected to the logic of normativity, without reducing normativity to teleology. It is only through his 
mobilisation of the work of Leroi-Gourhan, Simondon, and Canguilhem that Stiegler can make this 
point. 
Second, a critique of consumerism arises from the claim that the adoption of norms can be 
short-circuited by the imposition of modes of existence structured around adaption, that does not 
allow the time or the space for their transformation. This links the concept of diffrance to the material 
ways in which different individuation processes are produced by connected biological, social, and 
technical systems. As a synchronic movement towards the reduction of all processes to their meta-
stable relations without diachronic transformation, adaption is a dominant tendency within the regime 
of hyper-industrial consumption (Stiegler 2010a: 103). The integration of economic, technical and 
social systems submits individuation to the imperatives of financialisation, and the adaption to the 
production of new needs this regime requires in order to produce value (Stiegler 2010a: 82-3). This 
means that ways of life, formerly connected to the transformative adoption of techniques are not re-
interiorised by individuals, having become the target for consumption. Instead of adopting tradition 
by transforming it through diffrance, we are increasingly adapting to the imperative of consumption 
without this critical transformation. Human existence 'becomes entropic: it destroys that which is 
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precisely the goal of all these criteriologies,Õ this goal being the opening and adoption of a non-
inhuman future (Stiegler 2013b: 129). 
The materiality of the human regime of diffrance is central to this understanding of the divest-
ment of the individual of the time to adopt savoir faire and savoir vivre (Stiegler 2011a: 62). What 
Stiegler refers to as 'generalised proletarianisation' is this loss of skilled knowledge, which began 
with the factory worker in the industrial revolution, and has expanded to the knowledge of to how live 
oneÕs life.xi The incessant multiplication of imperatives to consume encourages the indulgence in 
purely adaptive behaviour and the obliteration of the individual time of delay, something enabled by 
real time technologies that reduce the time of critical interiorisation that transforms pre-individual 
funds. This is enforced through the spread of new criteria for the process of retention, which are 
massified by the homogenisation of collective secondary retentions, supported by technical memory, 
and exacerbated by the expansion of automation in the processes of the content of the various 
modes of human existence, anticipating and calculating what is always a deferred and un-unified 
future (Stiegler 2014c: 87-8; 2015a: 224-27). Adaption is the enforcement of unity upon becoming, 
an inhuman tendency that counters the non-inhuman openness of the future. This is the point at 
which StieglerÕs reading of diffrance is at its weakest. Despite the doubling of diffrance which 
allows it to refer to two separate individuation processes, articulated along different relations to pre-
individual funds, this political use relies on the reduction of diffrance to instantaneous transmission 
that reduces the time of critical reflection. This is something that Derrida rightly resists in the interview 
between the two: 'what we call real time is simply an extremely reduced ÔdiffranceÕ, but there is no 
purely real time because temporalization itself is structured by a play of retention or of protention, 
and consequently, of traces' (Derrida & Stiegler 2002: 129). 
Nevertheless, the hegemony of what Stiegler refers to as industrial temporal objects does im-
pinge on this structure of retentions and protentions that are bound within psychic individuation, 
because they draw from a pre-individual fund that is overdetermined by technical objects. The or-
ganological connection of social, technical, and biological organs enables this movement, as the 
becoming of the physical circuits of the brain are directly inscribed upon by technical processes of 
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individuation. Just as, for example, reading requires a particular cerebral arrangement, new forms 
of technological objects today are reorganising the brain once again. The political ramifications of 
the invention of writing and the spread of literacy are being overturned, as the organological condition 
of the human is being exploited, transforming the psychopower of wants and needs into a neu-
ropower that capitalises on the ability to directly intervene in the behaviour and formation of cerebral 
circuits (Stiegler 2010b: 190-1). Failing to acknowledge that we are at a profound event or juncture 
in the technical articulation of human diffrance or individuation, will miss what Stiegler contributes 
to contemporary political debates: that the intensification of the tendency towards the standardisation 
of modes of behaviour is reducing existence to one characterised by dis-individuation, a mode of 
diffrance which does not allow the differentiation of the future. What Stiegler refers to as ÔNoo-
PoliticsÕ is the organisation of modes of existence that keep the human regime of individuation open 
by allowing adoption and critical transformation of pre-individual funds, rather than submitting to an 
adaptive tendency that dissolves the works of culture (Stiegler 2010b: 180-81). Stiegler argues that 
the task of politics is to keep the future of the non-inhuman open to adoptive transformation, rather 
than adaptive inhumanism. It is the transformative power of adoption that can alleviate the adaptive 
disindividuation at work in the biopolitical and psycho-political practices of marketing, which induce 
stupidity and the inability to transform the future (Stiegler 2015a: 235-37). 
At this point, Stiegler's work operates at an abstract level, advocating a politics of memory, 
attention, spirit, and Ônegative entropyÕ as a critique of hyper-industrial consumption. However, we 
can see a third political ramification of his reading of Derrida. For our purposes here, the value of 
StieglerÕs work is not to be found in explicit political proposals, but in the fact that it allows a widening 
of the perspective on the politics of deconstruction, beyond the impasses of messianism and the 
deferral of the decision. He relates the political to the necessity of the decision to adopt new norma-
tive forms of existence in particular determined contexts, while keeping this future open to the inde-
terminate through the transformative dimension of adoption (2015c: 91). The promise of the future 
does not arise from a primary Ôordeal of undecidability' (Derrida 1994: 94), but from a set of deter-
mined conditions from which the undecidable future must be created through adoption, against the 
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hegemonic imposition of adaption (Stiegler 2013a: 336-37). Below the criticism of consumption and 
the advocation of certain general models for politics, Stiegler provides a systematic understanding 
of how technical objects constitute the human in particular temporal and spatial realities. It is the 
incalculable adoption of, and projection forward from a determined situation that harbours the po-
tential for transforming the future. Hence, Stiegler imposes a distinction between becoming and the 
future, of which the latter must be produced through adoption (Stiegler 2015b). This forms the polit-
ical as a constant becoming non-inhuman, making decisions on a future that is always a collective 
fiction, and therefore something to be adopted, and not a becoming to merely be adapted to (Stiegler 
2011a: 148). 
This political position is only enabled by StieglerÕs reading of Derridean diffrance, which con-
nects the openness of the human future to an ever present technical support. As I have argued, this 
can only be understood through Stiegler's extension of the work of Leroi-Gourhan, Simondon, and 
Canguilhem. That is, he thinks diffrance as present both in life and in the human-technical relation-
ship, and as split into regimes, of which life in general and the human form of psycho-social individ-
uation are distinct but related forms. This inaugurates a different form of pathology and normativity 
in the human, where the technical opens up both an indeterminate future to be adopted, and the 
pathological inducement of adaption, calculating and closing off this future. Noo-Politics concerns 
establishing regimes of adoptive individuation that constructs new forms of human existence. The 
value of StieglerÕs work is that it poses a difficult and critical form of humanism in this Noo-Politics of 
becoming non-inhuman. As I have demonstrated, moving beyond Derrida, Stiegler wants to focus 
on the specific, pharmacological and material basis of these problems, and the particular decisions 
they force upon us. Stiegler's political project must, therefore, be seen in this light; the diffrance of 
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i Stiegler argues that connections must be made between Simondon and DerridaÕs work today, however the 
relationship between the two is not clear cut, and there is ample room for further work in this area. Besides the 
connections made in this piece on life, Stiegler makes remarks that suggest the Simondonian concepts of 
ÔresonanceÕ and transindividuation bear structural and conceptual similarities to diffrance and supplementa-
rity, which belies the necessity of understanding a deeper link between the work of Simondon and Derrida 
(Stiegler: 2006; Stiegler, Roberts, Gilbert & Hayward 2012: 179). The relationship between Stiegler, Leroi-
Gourhan, and Derrida has already received some critical treatment (Johnson 2013), but the connection of 
Stiegler and Derrida to Canguilhem is an area awaiting exploration. 
ii Diffrance should not be seen as homogeneously accepted across DerridaÕs interpreters, as it is StieglerÕs 
reading in particular that is being put forward here. For just three examples of contrasting readings, one might 
look to HgglundÕs view that DerridaÕs work is fundamentally atheistic, precisely because diffrance delimits 
any claim to the absolute (Hgglund 2008); John D. CaputoÕs argument that DerridaÕs work exhibits a complex 
intertwinement with negative and apophatic theological dimension of diffrance (Caputo 1997); or, Rodolphe 
GaschÕs argument that diffrance is coherent with the philosophical task of criticising reflection, but never-
theless maintains a system that is both open and coherent (Gasch 1986). 
iii StieglerÕs reading of Derrida in The Fault of Epimetheus is largely concentrated around the essay ÔDiffranceÕ 
and Of Grammatology. Across his oeuvre however, he engages with many Derridean concepts such as Ôshib-
bolethÕ, ÔiterabilityÕ the ÔpharmakaÕ and ÔbtiseÕ (See Stiegler 2009; 2013b; 2015b) While focused on the isolated 
topic of diffrance and life here, there is space for an investigation of StieglerÕs relationship to DerridaÕs corpus 
as a whole. For important work already published on this relationship see that of Ben Roberts (2005) & Ross 
(2013). 
iv This chapter was originally published as a review of The Fault of Epimetheus (Bennington 1996). 
v While it is beyond the scope of what is being argued here, in more recent work Stiegler defines life in terms 
of entropy and negative entropy, something that is also transformed by the intervention of technics in human 
existence (Stiegler 2015a). 
vi This separation between genetic and non-genetic memory characterises Molecular Biology's central dogma. 
vii Vitale highlights a crucial passage for DerridaÕs reading, where Jacob writes of the genetic material of he-
redity: ÔThe model that best describes our knowledge of heredity is indeed that of a chemical messageÉan 
alphabet like that of the Morse code. Just as a sentence represents a segment of text, so a gene corresponds 
to a segment of nucleic acid. In both cases, an isolated symbol means nothing; only a combination has any 
ÔsenseÕÉThe transformation of a nucleic acid sequence into a protein sequence is like the translation of a 
message received in Morse that does not make sense until it is translated, into English, for example. This is 
done by means of a ÔcodeÕ that provides the equivalence of signs between the two Ôalphabets'Õ (Vitale 2014: 
108; Jacob 1974: 275) 
viii For responses that also consent to, or present this view, see the work of Beardsworth (1998), Bradley (2011: 
120-142),  Roberts (2005) & Vaccari (2009). 
ix The concept of the pharmaka is taken from DerridaÕs reading of Plato in the Phaedrus, but expanded to refer 
to the technical constitution of the human (Derrida 1981; Stiegler 2013b: 19-22). 
x While the focus here is upon how StieglerÕs philosophy opens up a consideration of the indeterminate future 
of the human as political, what is not addressed in more detail is the way in which memory and the control of 
its technical basis is a site for political contestation. For more on this in particular see the work of Beardsworth 
(1995), Roberts (2006), and Sinnerbrink (2009), or for broader summaries of StieglerÕs politics, see Abbninett 
(2015), Beardsworth (2010), Crogan (2010), and Vesco (2015). 
xi Proletarianisation refers to Stiegler's adoption of the Simondonian reading of Marx, where the development 
of machine production and the division of labor divested workers of skills (savoir faire) that were interiorised 
and learnt prior to machinic production. StieglerÕs thesis is that under consumerism this tendency has extended 
into everyday life and we are currently being divested of knowledge of how to live our lives (savoir vivre). For 
an expanded summary of proletarianisation, see the work of Hutnyk (2013) 
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